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Robust stability in matching markets
Fuhito Kojima
Department of Economics, Stanford University
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to
be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined ma-
nipulation, where a student ﬁrst misreports her preferences and then blocks the
matching that is produced by the mechanism. We ﬁnd that even when school pri-
orities are publicly known and only students can behave strategically, there is a
priority structure for which no robustly stable mechanism exists. Our main re-
sult shows that there exists a robustly stable mechanism if and only if the priority
structure of schools is acyclic (Ergin 2002), and in that case, the student-optimal
stable mechanism is the unique robustly stable mechanism.
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1. Introduction
Matching theory has inﬂuenced the design of labor markets and student assignment
systems. Stability plays a central role in the theory: A matching is stable if there is no
individual agentwhoprefersbeingunmatchedtobeingassigned toherallocationinthe
matching, and there is no pair of agents who prefer being assigned to each other to be-
ing assigned to their respective allocations in the matching. In real-world applications,
empirical studies have shown that mechanisms often succeed whereas unstable ones
often fail.
In recent years, the incentive properties of stable mechanisms have attracted much
attention. Roth (1982) shows that any stable mechanism is manipulable. However,
if preferences of one side of the market are common knowledge, as in school choice
(Abdulkadiro˘ glu and Sönmez 2003) where school priorities are exogenously given by
law, the student-optimal stable mechanism is both strategy-proof and stable (Dubins
and Freedman 1981, Roth 1982). Indeed, the student-optimal stable mechanism has
been adopted in practical assignment problems, such as student assignment in New
York City and Boston, and the National Resident Matching Program.
However, most existing analysis has overlooked other types of manipulation, as sta-
bility and strategy-proofness have been studied separately. If agents are capable of
Fuhito Kojima: fuhitokojima1979@gmail.com
I am grateful to Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, Haluk Ergin, Guillaume Haeringer, Jinwoo Kim, Taro Kumano,
Yusuke Narita, Yuki Takagi, Kentaro Tomoeda, Alex Westkamp, Yosuke Yasuda, and especially Michael Os-
trovsky,AlRoth,theco-editor,andtwoanonymousrefereesforinsightfulcomments. PeterTroyanprovided
excellent research assistance.
Copyright © 2011 Fuhito Kojima. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial Li-
cense 3.0. Available athttp://econtheory.org.
DOI: 10.3982/TE780258 Fuhito Kojima Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
misreporting their preferences during the centralized matching process and also re-
matching (blocking) after the matching is announced, then they may be able to use
the combination of these manipulations to their advantage. Chakraborty et al. (2010)
consider the combination of these manipulations and propose a strong stability con-
cept that requires robustness against these manipulations in a matching problem with
interdependent values.1 Adapting their concept to the standard matching model with-
out interdependent values, we say that a mechanism is robustly stable if no student is
made strictly better off by a combined manipulation of misreporting preferences and
rematching.
Although this departure from the standard concepts may seem small, it has very
different implications on the design of matching mechanisms. First, we demonstrate
that even when school priorities are exogenously given and only students can behave
strategically, there is no robustly stable mechanism in general.
Given the above impossibility result, a natural question is what conditions allow for
a robustly stable mechanism. Our main result characterizes the existence of a robustly
stable mechanism in terms of the priority structure of schools. More speciﬁcally, we
show that there is a robustly stable mechanism in a market if and only if the priority
structure of schools in that market is acyclic (Ergin 2002). Moreover, if there is a robustly
stable mechanism, then it coincides with the student-optimal stable mechanism.
The analysis of this paper suggests that one cannot expect complete elimination of
manipulations even when only students can act strategically. If the social planner can
inﬂuence the priority structure, as in the case of student placement in public schools,
the theory suggests that acyclicity is likely to make the system immune to manipula-
tions. However, acyclicity is a very demanding condition, and so this paper suggests
that robust stability is hard to guarantee, even when the social planner can inﬂuence
the priority structure to some extent.
Are combined manipulations important in the real world? While a comprehensive
analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, a suggestive example can be found in the
school choice problem (Abdulkadiro˘ glu and Sönmez 2003). For instance, in New York
City,manystudentsparticipateinanappealsprocesstobeassignedtoaschooltheylike
better than their prescribed assignment (Abdulkadiro˘ glu et al. 2005, 2009). About 300
appeals out of about 5,000 were from students who received their stated ﬁrst choices.
This may suggest that students can engage in rematching in the school choice setting.
A more detailed discussion is given in the Conclusion.
Section 2 presents the model and the results. The relation to the literature is dis-
cussedafterthemainresultofthepaper. Section 3 concludes. Someproofsareprovided
in the Appendix.
2. Model and results
A matching problem is the tuple (S C P   q).S e t sS and C are ﬁnite and disjoint sets
of students and schools. For each student s ∈ S, Ps is a strict preference relation over C
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and being unmatched (denoted by ∅). We write cR s c  (where c c  ∈ C ∪{ ∅})i fe i t h e r
cP s c  or c = c . For each school c ∈ C,  c is a priority, which is a strict, complete, and
transitive binary relation over S.2 We write  =( c)c∈C.F o re a c hc ∈ C, qc is the quota
of c.A matching is a vector μ = (μs)s∈S that assigns a seat at school μs ∈ C or ∅ to
each student s, with seats in each school c assigned to at most qc students. We write
μc ={ s ∈ S | μs = c} for the set of students who are assigned seats at school c.T h es e to f
a student’s possible preferences is denoted by P.
We say that matching μ is blocked by (s c) ∈ S×C if cP s μs and either (1) |μc| <q c or
(2) |μc|=qc and s  c s  for some s  ∈ μc. A matching μ is individually rational if μs Rs ∅
for every s ∈ S and |μc|≤qc for every c ∈ C. A matching μ is stable if it is individually
rational and is not blocked.
We refer to a tuple (S C   q)as a market and consider a situation where only stu-
dent preferences are private information while the market (S C   q)is given. A mech-
anism is a function ϕ from P|S| to the set of all matchings. Mechanism ϕ is sta-
ble if ϕ(P) is a stable matching for every P ∈ P|S|. Mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof if
ϕs(P) Rs ϕs(P 
s P−s) for every P ∈ P|S|, s ∈ S,a n dP 
s ∈ P. Note that we allow only stu-
dents to report preferences; school priorities are publicly known. This assumption sim-
pliﬁestheanalysisandhelpsilluminatetheconsequencesofthestabilityconceptofthis
paper. Publicly known school priorities arise naturally in the school choice setting: As
Abdulkadiro˘ glu and Sönmez (2003) point out, school priorities are exogenously given
by law in many school districts. Similarly, Chakraborty et al. (2010)c o n s i d e rt w o - s i d e d
matching between students and colleges in which preferences of students are publicly
known. They motivate their assumption by noting that (i) information about colleges
is mostly public in practice and (ii) because of extant impossibility results, such an as-
sumption is necessary to obtain positive results. These points hold in our setting as well.
Definition 1. A mechanism ϕ is robustly stable if the following conditions are satis-
ﬁed.
(1) Mechanism ϕ is stable.
(2) Mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof.
(3) Thereexistnos ∈ S, c ∈ C, P ∈ P|S|,andP 
s ∈ P suchthat(i)cPsϕs(P)and(ii)s  c s 
for some s  ∈ ϕc(P 
s P−s) or |ϕc(P 
s P−s)| <q c.
In words, a mechanism is robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and also
immune to a combined manipulation, where a student ﬁrst misrepresents his or her
preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the centralized mecha-
nism. Condition (3) is the additional requirement over the combination of stability and
strategy-proofness, and it plays a central role in our analysis. To the best of our knowl-
edge, Chakraborty et al. (2010) are the ﬁrst to consider this combined manipulation in
2Asweareprimarilyinterestedintheschoolchoiceproblem, weassumethateverystudentisacceptable
to every school.260 Fuhito Kojima Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
two-sided matching.3 They consider a Bayesian game of matching with interdependent
values in which a player can both misreport in the matching process and rematch af-
terward. They say that a mechanism is stable if there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which all players report their signals truthfully and all players accept their assigned
partners on the equilibrium path. Although the direct comparison is somewhat subtle
because of modeling differences, the robust stability concept deﬁned here is conceptu-
ally close to and is motivated by the stability concept employed by Chakraborty et al.
(2010).
Given P, the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm produces a stable
matching ϕS(P) (Gale and Shapley 1962). The student-optimal stable mechanism is a
mechanism ϕS that produces ϕS(P) for every P ∈ P|S|. It is well known that ϕS is stable
(Gale and Shapley 1962) and strategy-proof (Dubins and Freedman 1981, Roth 1982).
Moreover, Alcalde and Barberà (1994) show that ϕS is the unique stable and strategy-
proof mechanism. The following example demonstrates, however, that ϕS is not im-
munetothecombinationofthesetwokindsofmanipulationseventhoughitisimmune
to each of them separately.




 a:1 2 3 q a = 1
 b:3 1 2 q b = 1 
Under the true preferences P = (P1 P2 P3), the student-optimal stable mechanism ϕS
produces ϕS(P) = (ϕS
1(P) ϕS
2(P) ϕS
3(P)) = (a ∅ b).
Now consider a false preference P 
2 of student 2, P 
2:∅  Then, under P  = (P 
2 P−2),
ϕS produces ϕS(P ) = (b ∅ a). Since aP 2 ∅ = ϕS
2(P) and 2  a 3 ∈ ϕS
a(P ), ϕS is not ro-
bustly stable. More speciﬁcally, student 2 has incentives to ﬁrst report P 
2 and then block
ϕS(P ), violating condition (3) of the deﬁnition of robust stability. ♦
Mechanism ϕS is the only mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof (Alcalde and
Barberà 1994). Thus Example 1 implies that given a priority structure, there does not
necessarily exist a robustly stable mechanism.
Theorem 1. There exists a priority structure for which there is no robustly stable mecha-
nism.
The next question to ask is whether we can say a mechanism is robustly stable in
a speciﬁc market. In other words, we investigate conditions on a pair (  q), called a
3In a different context of the principal–agent problem, Myerson (1982) considers a similar notion of
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priority structure, under which the mechanism is robustly stable. The following concept
will prove useful.
Definition2( Ergin2002). Let (  q)beaprioritystructure. Acycle is a b ∈ C, i j k ∈ S
such that
• i  a j  a k and k  b i
• there exist disjoint sets of students Sa Sb ⊂ S \{ i j k} such that |Sa|=qa − 1,
|Sb|=qb −1, s  a j for every s ∈ Sa,a n ds  b i for every s ∈ Sb.
A priority structure (  q)is acyclic if there exists no cycle.
With the above notion, we can now present our main result, which is a characteriza-
tion of markets for which a robustly stable mechanism exists.
Theorem 2. For market (S C   q), ϕS is robustly stable if and only if the priority struc-
ture (  q)is acyclic.
Given that ϕS is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism (Alcalde and Bar-
berà 1994), this theorem implies that, given the market, there exists a robustly stable
mechanism if and only if the priority structure is acyclic.
To obtain intuition for Theorem 2, it is useful to review Example 1.I f s t u d e n t 2
declares all schools unacceptable in the student-proposing deferred acceptance algo-
rithm, then students 1 and 2 apply to schools b and a, respectively, and both are admit-
ted. On thecontrary, if 2 reports that a is herﬁrstchoice, thenthatwilldisplace 3 from a.
Then 3 applies to his second choice b, displacing 1 from her ﬁrst choice b, resulting in
her applying to her second choice b.T h e nb rejects 2 and the algorithm terminates. By
refraining from applying to a,s t u d e n t2 can change matching of other students without
changingherownmatching(∅ inbothcases). Thisenableshertoengageinacombined
manipulation if she ﬁnds a to be acceptable: First misreport preferences so that other
students are matched differently than under truthtelling and then rematch with a more
preferred school a after the matching is prescribed. The property that students cannot
inﬂuence matchings of others without changing their own matches, called nonbossi-
ness, turns out to play a key role more generally. Ergin (2002)s h o w st h a tϕS is nonbossy
if and only if the priority structure is acyclic; the proof of Theorem 2 is based on his
result.
Theorems 1 and 2 suggest that manipulations may be unavoidable even when only
students can act strategically. If the social planner can inﬂuence the priority structure,
as in the case of student placement in public schools, the theory suggests that acyclic-
ity would make the system immune to manipulations.4 This point of view is shared
by a number of studies, from related but different aspects. Ergin (2002)s h o w st h a t
4Alternatively, the social planner could regulate the rematching process so that a student cannot be
matched to a more preferred school even if she has high priority.262 Fuhito Kojima Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
the student-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof if and only if the prior-
ity structure is acyclic. Haeringer and Klijn (2009) show that, in the school choice set-
ting, the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes under the student-optimal stable mecha-
nism (possibly with constraints on the length of rank order lists) coincides with the set
of stable matchings if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. Kesten (forthcoming)
shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism is immune to capacity manipulation
(Sönmez 1997) if and only if the priority structure of schools is acyclic. Following the
current paper, Afacan (2010) introduces the concept of group robust stability and in-
vestigates priority structures that guarantee the condition. Kesten (2006) introduces a
slightly stronger acyclicity concept and shows that the top trading cycles mechanism
coincides with the student-optimal stable mechanism if and only if the priority struc-
ture satisﬁes his version of acyclicity. The concept of acyclicity has been generalized to
coarse priorities, and acceptant and substitutable priorities (as deﬁned by Kojima and
Manea (2010)) by Ehlers and Erdil (2010)a n dKumano (2009), respectively.
An important related paper is Chakraborty et al. (2010). They consider a matching
marketwithinterdependentvaluesandintroduceastabilityconceptwiththepossibility
ofcombinedmanipulations. Inthatenvironment,theyestablishimpossibilitytheorems
that assert that there is no stable mechanism in their sense. Meanwhile they also note
that their impossibility theorems can be obtained even with a weaker notion of stabil-
ity, namely the combination of traditional stability and strategy-proofness as required
separately. The current study complements their study by showing that there does not
necessarily exist a robustly stable mechanism, even if there is no interdependent value
component, and then characterizing the condition necessary and sufﬁcient for the ex-
istence of a robustly stable mechanism. Note that our characterization result critically
depends on the assumption of private values. With interdependent values, Chakraborty
et al. (2010) show the impossibility of stable mechanisms even when the priority struc-
ture is acyclic, so our private values assumption is important in Theorem 2.
The deﬁnition of robust stability requires that the mechanism be immune to com-
bined manipulations even if a student knows everything about the environment and re-
ported preferences of other students. Clearly, perfect information is a strong assumption
in many applications. However, it turns out that combined manipulations are easy to
carry out without any knowledge other than the student’s own preferences. Speciﬁcally,
consider the following strategy of a student: (1) Declare all schools to be unacceptable
to the mechanism and (2) then rematch with her most preferred school available once
the matching is prescribed by the mechanism.5
Proposition 1. In ϕS, any student who uses the above strategy is matched to a school
that she weakly prefers to the school matched under truthtelling.
A related question is whether combined manipulations are expected in large mar-
kets.6 Proposition 1 impliesthatincentives forcombined manipulationsremainin large
5IamgratefultoanonymousrefereesforencouragingmetoconsiderthisissueandforsuggestingPropo-
sition 1.
6In the two-sided matching setting, Roth and Peranson (1999), Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), and
Kojima and Pathak (2008) show that manipulation incentives become small under ϕS as the market size
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markets (although the magnitude may as well become small). This is because a student
cansafelymisreportpreferencesandrematchwiththesameschoolasundertruthtelling
even in the worse case.
3. Conclusion
This paper introduces a new stability concept—robust stability. Theorem 1 demon-
strates that, given a priority structure, there does not necessarily exist a robustly stable
mechanism. This result suggests that one cannot eliminate manipulations completely,
even when agents on only one side of the market have private information. Then, The-
orem 2 characterizes the market structures that enable robustly stable mechanisms to
exist. If the social planner can design the priority structure, as in the case of student
placement to public schools, the theory suggests that acyclicity is likely to make the sys-
tem robust to manipulations. However, acyclicity is a very demanding condition, so one
possible way to read this paper is to say robust stability is not only impossible for ar-
bitrary markets (Theorem 1), but also is hard to guarantee by judiciously specifying a
priority structure (Theorem 2).
Theextantliteraturehasalsofoundacyclicpriority structurestobekeyinproducing
desirable properties in matching markets. Papers cited herein are only a few examples.
This paper identiﬁes one more sense in which such a structure proves critical for the de-
sign of matching markets. We envision thatinvestigating further implications of priority
structures may be a fruitful direction of future research.
Before concluding the paper, we comment on a conceptual issue. The model as-
sumes that school priorities are publicly known. Publicly known school priorities arise
naturally in the school choice setting: As Abdulkadiro˘ glu and Sönmez (2003) point out,
school priorities are exogenously given by law in many school districts. In such a case,
however, onemightarguethatschoolsarenotstrategicplayersand hencedonotpartic-
ipate in rematching, so combined manipulations are unimportant, and, instead, stabil-
ityandstrategy-proofnessaresufﬁcient. Eveninschoolchoice,however,robuststability
may be important. For instance, consider the appeals process. In student placement to
high schools in New York City, many students participate in an appeals process to be
assigned to a school they like better than their prescribed assignment (Abdulkadiro˘ glu
et al. 2005, 2009). For the academic year 2003–2004, the ﬁrst year when the student-
optimal stable mechanism was implemented there, more than 5,000 students appealed
their assignments, and about 300 appeals were from students who received their stated
ﬁrst choices.7 The Department of Education granted about half of the appeals. This
suggests that students may be able to engage in rematching even in the school choice
setting.8
Needless to say, the above interpretation is only suggestive. First, students are often
required to offer a reason for appeal, for instance, a new address. Second, it is not clear
7Interestingly, successful manipulations that appear in our analysis involve students rematching after
they receive their stated ﬁrst choices.
8I am grateful to Al Roth for suggesting this example.264 Fuhito Kojima Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
whether the same school priorities as those used in the initial allocation process are re-
spected during the appeals process. Also, it is difﬁcult to see whether students engage in
combined manipulations in actual school choice problems (the appeals may be due to
different reasons such as changes in student preferences). Even so, the analysis of this
paperraisesthepossibilitythatcombinedmanipulationsmayhappeninmatchingmar-
kets, and suggests that the market organizer take into account such possibilities when
designing a mechanism.
Another possible application is to labor markets where preferences of one side of
the market are publicly known. In this context, the assumption that preferences of one
side of the market are publicly known may be too strong. However, it may be a reason-
able ﬁrst approximation in some cases. For instance, ﬁrms may have sufﬁciently estab-
lished reputations so that workers’ preferences over ﬁrms can be estimated from them
with reasonable precision. A similar application is college admission. The assumption
that student preferences are known may be a reasonable approximation of actual col-
lege admission because information about colleges is mostly public in practice. A more
thorough analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future
research.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2
We say that mechanism ϕ is nonbossy if ϕs(P 
s P−s) = ϕs(P) implies ϕ(P 
s P−s) = ϕ(P).
The following result proves useful.
Result 1( Ergin 2002). Mechanism ϕS is nonbossy for market (S C   q)if and only if
(  q)is acyclic.9
Proof of the “only if” direction. We show the claim by contraposition. Suppose
thattheprioritystructureisnotacyclic. Then,bydeﬁnition,thereexista b ∈ C,i j k ∈ S
such that
• i  a j  a k and k  b i
• there exist disjoint sets of students Sa Sb ⊂ S \{ i j k} such that |Sa|=qa − 1,
|Sb|=qb −1, s  a j for every s ∈ Sa,a n ds  b i for every s ∈ Sb.





is acyclic. Result 1 follows from the two well known facts: (i) ϕS is strategy-proof for any priority structure,
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Ps :a ∅  for every s ∈ Sa
Ps :b ∅  for every s ∈ Sb
Ps :∅  for every s ∈ S \[{i j k}∪Sa ∪Sb] 
It is easy to see that ϕS
j (P) = ∅. Now consider a false preference of student j, P 
j : ∅  We
write P  = (P 
j P−j).T h e nϕS
k(P ) = a. Since aP j ∅ = ϕS
j (P) and j  a k ∈ ϕS
a(P ), ϕS is not
robustly stable.  
Remark. Intuitively, the proof of the “only if” direction is similar to Example 1.I tp r o -
ceeds by essentially “embedding” a small market as in Example 1 into any given market
with a cyclic priority structure by appropriately specifying student preferences.
Proof of the “if” direction. We show the claim by contradiction. To this end, sup-
pose that (  q)is acyclic but ϕS is not robustly stable. Since ϕS is stable and strategy-
proof, this assumption implies the following condition.
Condition A. There exist s ∈ S, c ∈ C, P ∈ P|S|,a n dP 
s ∈ P such that (i) cP s ϕS
s(P) and
(ii) s  c s  for some s  ∈ ϕS
c(P 
s P−s) or |ϕS
c(P 
s P−s)| <q c.
Letting P  = (P 
s P−s), we consider the following cases.
Case 1. Suppose ϕS
s(P ) = ∅.L e tP  
s :c ∅ and P   = (P  
s  P−s).
(a) Suppose ϕS
s(P  ) = ∅. Then, by deﬁnition of P  
s ,w eh a v e
cP   
s ϕS
s(P  )  (1)
Moreover, since (  q)is acyclic by assumption and hence ϕS is nonbossy by Re-
sult 1,w eh a v eϕS(P  ) = ϕS(P ).T h i sp r o p e r t ya n dCondition A imply that either
s  c s  for some s  ∈ ϕS
c(P ) = ϕS
c(P  ) or |ϕS
c(P  )|=| ϕS
c(P )| <q c. This and relation
(1)m e a nt h a tϕS(P  ) is unstable under P  , contradicting the assumption that ϕS
is a stable mechanism.
(b) SupposeϕS
s(P  ) = c Thenthisisacontradictiontostrategy-proofnessofϕS,since
ϕS
s(P  ) = cP s ϕS
s(P).
Case 2. Suppose ϕS
s(P )  = ∅.L e t
P  
s :∅
and P   = (P  
s  P−s). By the well known comparative statics by Kelso and Crawford (1982)
andGaleandSotomayor(1985), |ϕS
c(P )|≥| ϕS
c(P  )| and, if |ϕS
c(P )|=| ϕS
c(P  )|=qc,t h e n
there exists s   ∈ ϕS
c(P  ) such that s   c s   for all s  ∈ ϕS
c(P ).T h u sCondition A is satisﬁed
with respect to s, c,a n dP  
s (instead of P 
s) and, since ϕS
s(P  ) = ∅, the analysis reduces to
Case 1 above.  266 Fuhito Kojima Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Proof of Proposition 1
Let P be the true preference proﬁle of students and consider an arbitrary student s ∈ S.
First note that the result of the deferred acceptance algorithm is independent of the
order in which the applications are processed (McVitie and Wilson 1970), resulting in
ϕS(P).L e tc = ϕS
s(P). Now consider a reporting P 
s of student s that declares all schools
to be unacceptable. Then the matching ϕS(P 
s P−s) produced under the deferred ac-
ceptance algorithm under (P 
s P−s), coincides with a matching in which all applications
are processed by the deferred acceptance algorithm with respect to P except that no ap-
plications by student s a r ep r o c e s s e d .B yt h er e s u l to fMcVitie and Wilson (1970)c i t e d
above, if we let student s apply according to her true preferences Ps from then on, then
the resulting matching is ϕS(P) and thus matches s to c = ϕS
s(P). This is only possible
if s is accepted by c at some step of the deferred acceptance algorithm since ϕS(P 
s P−s)
was produced, so s can also match with c in the rematching stage if s has declared all
schools unacceptable at the deferred acceptance stage.
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